Research

• Most recent draft (August 24, 2024): download here

• Featured in the FinReg Blog sponsored by the Duke Financial Economics Center

• Presented at: AFA Meeting (2024); FMA Meeting (2023); Indiana University (2023); University of Denver (2023); CSU San Bernardino (2022); Rowan University (2022); Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Finance Group (2022); Cornell University (2022)

• Available at SSRN

Abstract: Using a 41% U.S. federal minimum wage increase in 2007 as a natural experiment, I find a 2.32% pay increase for the highest-paid (top) executives of small and medium U.S. public firms as measured by employment. I employ a triple-differences approach that exploits the distribution of workers across states and industries. After the hike, a 10% increase in employment share in states bound by federal minimum wage leads to a 6.7% increase in total top executive pay for firms in minimum-wage-sensitive industries relative to other industries. The results are consistent with top executives being compensated for extra risk and extracting rents due to strong bargaining power but inconsistent with mechanisms such as cost-of-living adjustment, efficiency wages, tournament incentives, shareholder constraints, and employee morale. The results are robust to controlling for firm profitability, observable firm characteristics using a matched sample, and local economic conditions using counties along contiguous state borders.

• Featured in the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance

• Presented at: Cornell University* (2023), Depaul University* (2023), University of Colorado - Boulder* (2023), Duke University* (2022), NBER Race and Stratification Working Group Meeting* (2022), Tulane University* (2022), Ohio State University* (2021), University of Delaware* (2021), University of Mannheim* (2021) (*Presented by co-author)

• Available at SSRN

Abstract: We document racial disparities in the U.S. corporate director labor market. Through 2019, the underrepresented minority (URM) new directorships share was significantly lower than the URM managerial labor force share. After 2020, we find changes in appointment behavior which coincide with the acceleration of the racial justice movement, passage of the California board diversity law, and implementation of the Nasdaq diversity rule. Black director appointments increased 185% following George Floyd’s murder and the California and Nasdaq mandates increased minority director appointments from groups not traditionally underrepresented. Our analysis is suggestive of search frictions, inattention, and racial bias causing these racial disparities.

Abstract: coming soon

Abstract: Using a regression discontinuity framework combined with a borders-based identification approach, we examine whether federal grant and procurement spending are directed toward closely-contested presidential ”battleground” states, and whether these spending patterns have real effects on the location of corporate activity. Using a dataset of government procurement and grant contracts from 2000-2020, a period that covers six presidential election cycles, we find that counties in located in battleground states receive more federal funds in the years that follow a closely-contested election. We test whether this effect leads firms in government-dependent industries to locate operations in states thought to be crucial in presidential elections.