Most recent draft (May 2025): download here
Featured in the FinReg Blog sponsored by the Duke Financial Economics Center
Presented at: AFFECT Mentoring Workshop (2025), AFA Meeting (2024); FMA Meeting (2023); Indiana University (2023); University of Denver (2023); CSU San Bernardino (2022); Rowan University (2022); Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Finance Group (2022); Cornell University (2022)
Available at SSRN
Abstract: Top executive pay at U.S. public firms increases by 2.3% when employee pay increases due to the 41% federal minimum wage hike in 2007. Exploiting establishment-level data, my main difference-in-differences design compares firms with larger shares of employees in states bound by the federal minimum wage (“treated”) to firms with smaller shares (“control”) over time. I find that the effect is more pronounced in minimum-wage-sensitive industries (i.e., leisure and retail) and in firms that are smaller or face a high probability of distress, consistent with executives being compensated for increased distress risk after the hike.
Featured in the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
Presented at: Cornell University* (2023), Depaul University* (2023), University of Colorado - Boulder* (2023), Duke University* (2022), NBER Race and Stratification Working Group Meeting* (2022), Tulane University* (2022), Ohio State University* (2021), University of Delaware* (2021), University of Mannheim* (2021) (*Presented by co-author)
Available at SSRN
Abstract: We document racial disparities in the U.S. corporate director labor market. Through 2019, the underrepresented minority (URM) new directorships share was significantly lower than the URM managerial labor force share. After 2020, we find changes in appointment behavior which coincide with the acceleration of the racial justice movement, passage of the California board diversity law, and implementation of the Nasdaq diversity rule. Black director appointments increased 185% following George Floyd’s murder and the California and Nasdaq mandates increased minority director appointments from groups not traditionally underrepresented. Our analysis is suggestive of search frictions, inattention, and racial bias causing these racial disparities.
Abstract: coming soon
Abstract: Using a regression discontinuity framework combined with a borders-based identification approach, we examine whether federal grant and procurement spending are directed toward closely-contested presidential ”battleground” states, and whether these spending patterns have real effects on the location of corporate activity. Using a dataset of government procurement and grant contracts from 2000-2020, a period that covers six presidential election cycles, we find that counties in located in battleground states receive more federal funds in the years that follow a closely-contested election. We test whether this effect leads firms in government-dependent industries to locate operations in states thought to be crucial in presidential elections.